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Welcome to this meeting on the Law of the Sea Conference. We are for-
tunate in having here today five outstanding experts, including three leading
participants in this important international activity.
First of all is the distinguished head of the Mexican delegation to the Con-
ference, Ambassador Jorge Castafteda. Ambassador Castafteda has been a
leading participant in the Conference and its predecessor-the United Nations
Preparatory Committee-for some seven years. He has long been a legal and
political adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with particular reference to
international and United Nations affairs and is a member of the International
Law Commission which puts him in the top rank of practicing international
law experts.
Following him, Bernard Oxman, Deputy Head of the United States Delega-
tion to the Conference and an Assistant Legal Adviser in the State Depart-
ment, will give you some perceptions from the standpoint of our government.
Bernie has been with this since the beginning in 1967.
The next speaker is Myron Nordquist who was a member of the United
States Delegation and of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser until
last year. He then took a leave of absence to undertake a special law of the sea
project at the University of Virginia. Myron has not only been an outstanding
participant but is a leading scholar in this field.
Following Myron, John Laylin, for many years a Senior Partner in the
Washington law firm of Covington & Burling and a member of the State
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Department's Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, will deal with the
important area of deep ocean mining, with industry. John has long been active
in this Section and in the formulation of American Bar Association positions
on the law of the sea. ABA reports on this subject have frequently been the
result of his excellent drafting.
Finally, Professor Sohn of Harvard, an active member and counsellor to
this Section, Professor of International Law at Harvard, and a leading
member of the U.S. Delegation since 1968, will tell you where we stand on
what is probably the most significant achievement of this Conference so far,
namely the development of procedures on the compulsory settlement of
disputes.
Now, I am not here to make a speech, but I do feel that it may be helpful to
both you and the speakers if I briefly give you some background on the Con-
ference and its various components.
First of all, a brief word on the history of this exercise. As most of you
know, some eighty nations at the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea
adopted four Conventions drafted by the International Law Commission.
These have been in force for many years. The breadth of the territorial sea was
not settled then or at a second Conference in 1960. As a result, some govern-
ments continued to canvass support for a further Conference on this and
related issues, such as passage through straits and archipelagoes. Then, in
1967, Ambassador Pardo of Malta spoke at length in the United Nations on
the vast mineral wealth in the form of manganese nodules on the deep ocean
floors and this led to the formation of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabeds.
In 1969 this Committee became a permanent Committee on the Resources of
the Ocean Floors Beyond National Jurisdiction. The problems of how far na-
tional jurisdictions extended, the rights of coastal states in territorial seas,
straits, and beyond, and the legal content of the principle of "common
heritage of mankind" in mineral resources led to the decision in 1972 to start a
third Conference in 1973.
Secondly, the issues were extensively debated in the Seabeds Committee,
even though this was primarily concerned with deep-ocean mining. The
preliminary work of this preparatory Committee determined the structure of
the Conference itself. Because the start had been made with deep-ocean min-
ing, that subject became the responsibility of what was called Committee One.
All other issues set out in a long list of issues adopted by the preparatory Com-
mittee were put under Committee Two, except the issues of marine pollution,
scientific research and the transfer of technology assigned to a Committee
Three. Finally, when at the first substantive session of the Conference, in
Cardcas, the subject of compulsory settlement of disputes was developed, that
led in effect to a Fourth Committee, although it has actually been a plenary
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. I
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea
session of the Conference as a whole, under the chairmanship of the President
of the Conference.
Thirdly, the Conference is composed of the entire international community,
with the sole exception of a few new states that apparently have not been able
to organize themselves for it and to attend the sessions. At the last session 148
States out of some 155 were accredited.
Fourthly, it is always essential to bear in mind the geographical, political
and economic groupings in the international community. The geographical
groupings are roughly as follows: There are forty-seven African States, thirty-
eight Asian States, twenty-six Latin American, twenty-seven from the group
known as Western European and Other (the "Other" comprising Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and the United States), and ten East European,
sometimes called the Communist States.
In the organization of the Conference it was important to provide a place in
the leadership for a representative of each of these groups. This was worked
out by appointing an African, Paul Bamela Engo, as Chairman of the First
Committee; an Asian, Amerasinghe of Ceylon, as President of the Conference
as a whole; a Latin American, Ambassador Aguilar of Venezuela, as Chair-
man of the Second Committee; an East European, Yankow of Bulgaria, as
Chairman of the Third Committee; and a representative of the W.E.O. group,
Ambassador Beesley of Canada, as Chairman of the drafting committee.
That is the structure of the Conference itself. Apart from the division of
countries as between north and south or developed and underdeveloped coun-
tries, there are the extremely important divisions cutting across North-South
groupings, such as the coastal States (they are subdivided into States with long
coastlines and States with short coastlines) and the land-locked States; States
with broad and narrow continental shelves and States with none; so-called
geographically disadvantaged States (those States with short coastlines or
locked in, such as Singapore, behind the economic zones of other States);
fishing States with offshore fisheries and distant water fishing States with no
home fisheries or only small ones; maritime States with large navigation in-
terests, both developed (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Ger-
many, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden etc.) and less developed
(India, Pakistan) countries; States involved in marine boundary disputes;
States interested in deep-ocean mining versus land producers of the minerals
involved, such as Canada, Chile, France, Gabon and Zambia; island States;
archipelago States; States interested in scientific research; and States con-
cerned with pollution.
Let me just mention briefly that there have been five sessions dealing with
substantive issues and one procedural session, the first procedural session hav-
ing taken place at the end of 1973. The second (or first working, or substan-
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tive) session took place in Caracas in 1974, the next at Geneva in the spring of
1975. The fourth was held in New York in the spring of 1976 followed by
another New York session, or fifth, in the summer of 1976. Finally, a sixth or
third New York session has just been concluded.
As a result of this last session the various texts that had been produced at the
earlier sessions were consolidated in what is now known as a Composite In-
formal Negotiating Text.
That is enough background. I shall now ask Ambassador Castafteda to give
us some of his perceptions of where this Conference is now headed.
Ambassador Jorge Castafieda,
Chief of Mexican Delegation to
Law of the Sea Conference
First, I would like to thank the American Bar Association for this oppor-
tunity to speak before such a distinguished and learned audience. I think that a
proper understanding of these issues is essential if we are to have a viable Con-
vention. If there is a case where support of public opinion is required for the
acceptance and future implementation of a treaty, this is certainly it.
The subject is very vast. All aspects of the utilization of the seas and the
seabed are covered in the texts emerging from the Conference. Navigation,
fisheries, all the questions relating to oil and mineral exploitation inside and
outside boundaries of national jurisdiction, questions of security, military
considerations-everything is there. It is an extremely ambitious undertaking.
Also-and this is very important for developing countries-the treaty and the
work of the Conference are seen by some as an opportunity to achieve a more
equitable distribution of valuable resources both living and nonliving. The
subject is so vast that only a very small part of it can be dealt with in a half
hour. I would, therefore, like to say first just a few words on the method of
work of the Conference, on the essential elements of the new and very impor-
tant institution emerging from the Conference, that is thc Exclusive Economic
Zone, and finally on the final stages of the negotiating process during this
summer's session in New York.
Never before in history has such a large Conference met for the purpose of
codifying and developing an important chapter of international law. The main
difference between this Conference and the previous 1958 and 1960 Geneva
Conferences, which codified the then existing international law of the sea and
to which Mr. Haight has just referred, is that there was then a document that
served as a basis for the work of the Conference. That was the draft treaty
elaborated by the International Law Commission over a fairly long period,
from 1949 to 1956. This was done by a body of jurists, not acting on behalf of
their governments, but in their own individual capacities as experts, although
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the successive reports of the Commission were submitted to and commented
on by governments and debated in the U.N. General Assembly. This is the
normal procedure for International Law Commission Reports. So it was easier
then for the Conference to work speedily on the basis of a well-prepared docu-
ment and one that had already, by and large, been accepted by most States.
In the case of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, most of
the subjects were codification subjects: that is, the purpose of the treaty was
mostly the restatement of existing international law, customary rules that were
to be codified in treaty form. Aside from the question of the continental shelf,
which was fairly new, and perhaps the Convention on the Conservation of
Fisheries, which did not depart from existing international law, the rest was
mere codification strictu sensu.
Now in the case of the current Conference, codification has not been the ob-
jective. The need for the Conference arose because many countries felt that
completely new rules, in certain respects, were required. The proper way to
describe this would not be "codification" but rather "progressive
development" of international law. The main new concept that arose from the
Conference was, as I have said, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the com-
pletely new chapter on the exploitation of the seabed mineral resources. These
two new subjects, being of a political character to a large extent, governments
would not have been willing to entrust the task of formulating them to a body
of independent jurists. The view was generally held that States themselves
through their representatives should undertake to establish the basic guidelines
that eventually would be incorporated in a treaty.
This is why the Preparatory Committee, which started with a very large
composition of eighty-odd States-and at one point near the end of more than
100-had to start its work without any basis. This was, of course, the main dif-
ficulty. It took at least three to four years, until the end of the CarAcas session
of the Conference in 1974, before the main trends emerged through constant
repetition and discussion of issues. Only then was it possible to have as a basis
for future work a document that had at least reduced the number of options
open to a few-two or three for each subject. Before that there were many
positions regarding each question and it was, of course, impossible to even
think of starting to draft a treaty under those conditions. It was essential to
have something more concrete on which to polarize attention, to focus the
discussion.
The first documents that then emerged were called "Basic Trends." These
were produced by the respective Chairmen of the three Committees through a
process of selecting from the large number of alternatives suggested by States
those considered to represent the main trends. This was the first paper. During
the second substantive session of the Conference, in Geneva in 1975, through
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constant discussion in the different Committees, little by little, the dominant
trends began to emerge in each Committee. The respective Chairmen were en-
trusted with the task of reducing the main options on each topic to one and of
thereby formulating what was then called the Single Negotiating Text as a
basis for negotiations. Of course, this did not represent any real agreement
among the States which had participated in the previous debates. The single
text merely set out those solutions which the respective Chairmen thought
might be conducive to future agreement or as the best basis for negotiations.
The text, however, had no status as an agreement. After this came a second
revision, the Revised Single Negotiating Text, in which the Chairmen of the
respective Committees again perfected or gave more precision to their previous
text; or they changed it somewhat, so as to reflect trends emerging from the
further discussions.
Finally, and this is the last stage in which we are now, the four parts of the
text were integrated into a Single Composite Text. This does not have at pres-
ent any more official status than the previous texts, except that it is a third con-
secutive effort, and, therefore, represents a more refined text in the sense that,
in accordance at least with the opinion of the three Chairmen and the Presi-
dent of the Conference, acting jointly, it is a paper which is more likely to
command greater support from a larger number of members than the previous
texts. Certainly some parts of the Single Composite Text do require further
negotiations in order to achieve a general consensus on all parts of it. There is
one part, dealing with seabed mining, which is behind the others in this
respect. Basic opposition still exists between the views of one group of coun-
tries and those of another group. The other three parts in the Revised Single
Negotiating Text now seem to be closer to an eventual point of convergence of
views. It might even be said that they are close to what would be a consen-
sus-a basis for future action by the Conference. I refer to Part II dealing with
the general subjects on the law of the sea; to Part III on pollution and scientific
research; and to Part IV on the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Many people feel that the time taken up to now is too long. The work of the
Preparatory Committee and the Conference has lasted altogether for about
seven or eight years. In the midst of the process of negotiation this seems much
too long. But in the future, when we look back at the circumstances and the
difficulties I have described, the process might not seem at all too long a time
for what has been accomplished. Actually, the 1958 Conference, in spite of the
fact, as I have said, that it was mostly codification, took all together about ten
years, from 1949 to 1958. If there is a treaty next year or in 1979, it will have
taken just about the same time but with much greater difficulties. So I don't
think that it can be said that no substantial progress has been made since we
started this exercise in 1971.
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Exclusive Economic Zone
Now, I would like to say a few words regarding the basic elements of the
Exclusive Economic Zone. This new notion or institution was due to the initia-
tive of developing countries. At first it was very strongly resisted by the mar-
itime and fishing powers, including the United States. Now it can be said that
it has commanded practically universal acceptance. Some may like it more
than others. Some are barely resigned to accepting it because they cannot do
otherwise. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that by now it is accepted by all
basic groups of States. Although there are differences of opinion as to its con-
tents, these are not (in my opinion) insuperable or essential.
For instance, the Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged States
group does not agree with certain features. They would want greater recogni-
tion of the rights of neighboring Land-Locked or Geographically Disadvan-
taged States in the Economic Zones of their neighbors or of States in the same
region or sub-region. This is still a major problem. It has not been settled, but
negotiations are proceeding and I do not think that in the end this will prove to
be an insurmountable obstacle. I think that there will be agreement on this.
The reason why coastal States-particularly developing coastal States-
took the initiative to propose the Economic Zone was that they felt that living
resources near their coasts were being excessively exploited by distant water
modern efficient fleets under the principle of freedom of the high seas, which
entails freedom of fishing. This exploitation was depriving their own small
fleets of significant and real (not merely legal) opportunities to benefit from
those resources close to their coasts. For example, Mexico had to argue for
years with the United States to convince them that our case to establish this
Economic Zone was just. You even protested less than two years ago when we
established our Economic Zone. The situation has changed considerably since
then. You eventually reached the same conclusions when you reacted in the
same way to Japanese and Russian fishing near your coasts. The first time I
was really convinced that this new notion of the Economic Zone would
become a reality was when I saw a sign outside a fish market near Boston say-
ing something like "Drive those Russians outside the 200 miles." I knew then
that the Economic Zone was eventually going to be accepted all over the
world.
Now, what are the essential features of the Exclusive Economic Zone? The
coastal State has certain rights which have been characterized as sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploiting and managing the living and nonliving
resources up to a distance of 200 miles from their coasts beyond a territorial
sea of 12 miles. So, first, they have sovereign rights over resources, living and
nonliving; then, they have jurisdiction, which is not now characterized as
"exclusive," regarding scientific research. They also have jurisdiction regard-
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 1
28 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
ing the preservation of the marine environment. Then there are rights and
jurisdiction regarding the construction and erection in the Economic Zone of
all sorts of installations, artificial islands, etc. and other rights which are
specified in the Convention. These coastal States' rights were spelled out in
former Article 44 of the Single Negotiating Text. There was then another Arti-
cle, which was in a way a pendant of Article 44, spelling out the rights and
freedoms of other States, whether land-locked or not, in the Economic Zone
of the coastal State. That was Article 46 which stated very clearly that all other
States enjoyed all the traditional freedoms of navigation, overflight, and lay-
ing of submarine pipelines and cables. Then it added "and other international-
ly lawful uses of the sea related to navigation and communication." This was
changed in the final negotiations to which I shall refer later, at the request of
the United States and after long and difficult discussions, in order to state
more explicity what these uses were. The formula which was finally incorpo-
rated in the new Composite Text reads as follows: "and other internationally
lawful uses of the sea related to the freedoms such as those associated with the
operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compat-
ible with the other provisions of the present Convention."
The main problem, pending up to the very end of this last session, was the
legal nature of the Zone. For many years the Conference discussed this ques-
tion of the legal status of the Exclusive Economic Zone. Some countries main-
tained from the beginning and some jurists even continue to maintain at pres-
ent, that the Economic Zone should be considered as a sort of territorial sea
with clearly recognized exceptions in favor of third countries as regards the
traditional freedoms of navigation, overflight, etc., etc. This was one of the
two initial positions. Other countries, on the contrary, advocated the
Economic Zone as part of the high seas in which certain rights and jurisdic-
tions were specifically recognized, as an exception, to coastal States in regard
to fisheries and partially for scientific research and the preservation of the
marine environment. Insistence upon either one of those theses would have
absolutely blocked the reaching of any agreement on the subject and might
possibly have been an obstacle to the reaching of an overall agreement in the
Conference. This was discussed for years and years without any solution,
without any of the two trends gaining ground. Finally, after many years, the
inevitable conclusion was drawn that the Exclusive Economic Zone was
neither the high seas with exceptions for coastal countries nor, on the other
hand, territorial waters with exceptions in favor of all other States. The
Economic Zone was governed, or should be considered to be governed, by a
specific international statute of its own. It is a zone subject to a specific inter-
national legal regime, or, as it was often called, a regime sui generis.
The rights pertaining to coastal States and to other States in the Zone were
devised to meet new interests and needs, and, therefore, could not be assim-
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ilated to rights derived from the former well-known traditional categories of
high seas or territorial seas. It is a new zone with a new statute, in which such
essential rights as the rights of fishing and exploiting mineral resources, which
belonged to all States, are now rights of the coastal State. It is also a zone
where you have to conciliate and harmonize rights belonging to different
States. Of course, the legal nature of the Economic Zone is decisive in solving
the problem of residual rights. It is logical that, in the future, new and un-
foreseeable uses of the sea may arise. So, it is natural to suppose that con-
flicts may occur between the rights of coastal States and those of other States
regarding new uses of the seas and their resources in the Exclusive Economic
Zone, as both are entitled to utilize the Zone for different purposes. There can
also be conflicts between competitive and legitimate uses of the sea by coastal
States and other States. For example, a conflict may arise between fishing or
oil drilling by a coastal State and navigation by another State. How are such
problems to be solved?
If the Zone is basically to be considered as either part of the high seas with
exceptions or territorial waters with exceptions, this would prejudge the settle-
ment of these conflicts. Since it proved impossible to reach agreement in the
Conference as to whether the Zone should be considered high seas or ter-
ritorial seas, it was indispensable that certain guidelines or directives be laid
down for the settlement of that type of foreseeable conflict or controversy.
This was the raison d'etre of former Article 47 of the Single Negotiating Text,
and of Article 59 of the Composite Text. There it is established that, if certain
rights or jurisdictions are not clearly attributed by the Convention either to the
coastal State or to other States, then in case of dispute or conflict between the
opposing interests of these States, such conflicts are to be settled on the basis
of equity, due weight being given to the respective interests and rights in-
volved. There cannot be a single formula settling all foreseeable disputes.
Since, precisely, the regime of the Economic Zone is sui generis, there is no
general rule in the Convention by which, in principle, either the coastal States'
rights or those of third party States would prevail. In equity, whatever right
seems to be more weighty in each concrete case would prevail, due attention
being paid, of course, to the interests of the whole international community
and of other States. This Article was included in the Convention as a guideline
for this category of disputes, but it was not merely a provision for the settle-
ment of disputes. It was a substantive provision, a directive, as to how these
conflicts should be settled.
Now, a few words on the final stages of the negotiating process in the Con-
ference. In spite of the fact that, by and large, most of the main questions on
the law of the sea generally (territorial sea, passage through straits, continental
shelf, etc.) had been solved, as well as those on scientific research, pollution
and peaceful settlement, there still remained a few key questions which had not
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been really settled and where there was a sharp division of opinion between
different groups of States. There were three main questions. First, the question
of the legal nature of the Economic Zone, together with an acceptable for-
mulation of the rights of coastal and other States in it. Second, the question of
whether there should be a regime of consent or of mere notification regarding
scientific research in the Economic Zone. Third, the question of peaceful set-
tlement of certain disputes arising out of the exercise by a coastal State of its
sovereign rights within the Economic Zone. We thought those were the main
pending issues.
As I have tried to explain, the Conference had been altogether unable in
seven years of negotiations to devise a way of establishing small viable bodies
for the purpose of negotiating the issues and not for merely restating views.
Not once in seven years was the Conference able to establish such a group. The
main obstacle was the matter of composition. Whenever someone suggested
that a small negotiating group of, say, fifteen members should established,
someone inevitably added one or more countries. As every group must be
balanced, very soon there would be twenty-five to thirty-five members. When
this process of escalation brought the total to nearly forty inevitably someone
suggested that the only solution was to have an open-ended body, where again
and again the basic positions were merely restated and no real negotiations
took place. Under these circumstances it was thought that if we were to work
outside the official frame of the Conference, so to speak, and if we tried to get
together a small and unofficial, but highly representative group of countries, it
might be possible to take up these three questions together and try to deal with
them in an integrated way, so that a package solution might be achieved.
And so a very informal and small negotiating group was created, which had
absolutely no official status because it had not been established by the Con-
ference or by its Committees. It was started as an invitation to a dinner from
me as Chairman of the Mexican delegation. No host of a social gathering has
to justify his list of guests, nor is he obliged to increase it. The composition of
the group was, I thought, as balanced as possible for the purpose of the
meetings. It comprised the following: The United States and the United
Kingdom; from the Latin Americans: Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela; from the
Asians: India and Singapore; from the Africans: Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria
and Egypt; from Eastern Europe: the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria; and, finally,
three developed but coastal States: Australia, Canada and Norway. At a later
stage Peru was added to the list and also participated, in my view, very con-
structively. The group held eleven meetings during the last three weeks of the
Conference. The sessions lasted an average of four or five hours. They were
usually held at night and mostly in the offices of the different delegations and
not in the U.N. Headquarters Building.
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After an initial debate and examination of the numerous existing pro-
posals, it was agreed that no progress could be made unless the group focused
on a single set of proposals as a basis for negotiation. Ambassador Windeness
of Norway and I were entrusted with the task of acting together as
co-rapporteurs and presenting single draft proposals. We presented a doc-
ument containing proposals on all pending questions. In the light of the debate
that followed, we then presented a revised set. Altogether we submitted four
successive working documents, each one more refined and closer to an even-
tual consensus. The fourth and last was presented on July 12th, three days
before the end of the Conference session. The debates were frank and
sometimes very pugnacious.
Unfortunately, we just do not have time here to explain and discuss the
formulas contained in the package that emerged from this group. Actually,
they did not emerge as an agreement or even an implied agreement among the
participants. No one was committed to the final results and every delegation is
free to criticize or to propose changes or amendments in the future to these
formulas. Nevertheless, there was, I think, a basic agreement among a fairly
large number of the participants on most of the provisions that emerged as a
compromise. Some members were very unhapy with them. As always happens
with compromise proposals, nobody is really very happy with the result. Even
the co-authors felt that they would have preferred something else. In fact, as
far as Mexico is concerned, we would have preferred some of the provisions of
the old Single Negotiating Text. It is obvious that the United States preferred
the formulas which it presented. Nevertheless, by and large the results are
likely to be, let's say, closer to a point of consensus than the formulas of the
previous Single Negotiating Text.
The final package was presented to the President of the Conference and to
the Chairmen of Committees II and III by the two co-rapporteurs, not as
agreed results of the negotiations, but as texts-though deprived of any status
-which in the opinion of the two co-rapporteurs seemed to be more con-
ducive to general consensus. Though the final document was thoroughly
debated in Committees II and Il, no paternity was attributed to it. The docu-
ment was simply "floated."
With the exception of the provisions on peaceful settlement of disputes
arising from the exercise by coastal States of their sovereign rights in the
Economic Zone, all of the provisions that emerged from this unofficial group
found their way into the new Composite Text.
I thank you for your patience and apologize for this long statement.
MR. HAIGHT: Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Ambassador. Bernie
Oxman of the State Department will speak next and I expect to some extent on
some of the points that Ambassador Castafieda has covered.
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Whatever else can and may be said about the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text, it is a lawyer's paradise. It has sixteen Parts comprising 303
Articles with 7 Annexes. It covers the entire body of the international law of
the sea. As some of you may know, this can well be regarded as the birthplace
of modern international law. Some, including the Wall Street Journal, seem to
feel that it will now be the burial place of such law!
In evaluating a conference of this sort, it ought to be borne in mind that
of this entire document the only part (aside from specific Articles which are
still contested) that could be regarded as a comprehensive failure to provide
any basis whatsoever for accommodation in the international community
as a whole, is Part Eleven dealing with deep seabed mining and the two An-
nexes which are associated with it, Annexes II and III. In assessing this situa-
tion, I think that one ought to step back and take a look at some facts, par-
ticularly since I have been rather disturbed by information appearing in
newspapers, Platt's Oilgram and elsewhere, which, while they do not contain
misstatements of facts, give distinct misimpressions as to what the facts really
are. This is usually due to the fact that the subject is exceedingly complex and
it is normally no fault of the reporter that not all of the nuances are included.
Therefore, I would like to step back and deal with the geography of the situa-
tion for a moment.
Moving from the coastline out, the first area of significance that one tradi-
tionally encountered in the international law of the sea was the legal regime of
the territorial sea. As you know, this is subject to complete coastal State
sovereignty subject to a right of innocent passage for vessels on the surface.
The simple proposed movement extending the territorial sea from three miles
to twelve miles, which doesn't seem like much, would have the effect (in the
absence of alternative legal adjustments) of territorializing virtually all of the
major straits in the world-Gibraltar, Dover, Malacca (I could go on forever),
including a large number of straits in the Caribbean. Therefore, the effect of a
seemingly small movement of that sort could be enormous.
Moving out beyond that again, in terms of geography, one speaks here of
200-mile zones-some claiming territorial sea, others fishery zones. The pro-
posal in the text is an Exclusive Economic Zone. The significance of a 200-mile
limit, I venture to say, is not apparent to the ordinary American because of the
fact that American coasts face the open ocean. Virtually every major enclosed
or semi-enclosed sea in the world would be completely overlapped by a
200-mile limit-for example, the Gulf of Mexico, with a very small area left;
the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Caribbean; virtually all of Southeast
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Asia, because of the presence of islands, etc. If you conceive of those areas as
being completely territorialized, you would have completely revolutionized the
question of the legal rights of States to communicate with each other.
Next, our natural resources-a point that has been grossly misunderstood
by parts of the public. First, over ninety percent of all commercial fisheries in
the world are exploited within 200 miles of the coast of some country. Second,
virtually all of the hydrocarbons offshore are located within 200 miles of the
coast of some country-except for some that are located on the continental
shelf or continental margin, which in some areas extends somewhat beyond
200 miles, and which under this text would also fall under the control of
coastal States.
The significance of this is that, whatever the argument may be about deep-
seabed mining, it is not essentially an argument about hydrocarbons. It is an
argument about mining nodules and about possible hard minerals to be found
beneath the surface of the seabed. When Platt's Oilgram reports that the
Single Negotiating Text contains a new provision allowing production controls
for the exploitation of oil in the deep seabeds, there may well be important
reasons to object to it. But one should not jump to the conclusion that this
Conference is considering production controls for the production of hydrocar-
bons in terms of their major sources within the seabeds.
The question of environmental protection is frequently misunderstood when
it comes to the oceans. Degradation of the ocean environment is a global prob-
lem because the degradation itself moves with the currents, with the winds,
with the atmosphere. There is no way in which any coastal nation can con-
ceivably protect its coastline from all the potential sources of pollution by an
assertion of pollution control jurisdiction off of its own coasts. It simply will
not work. It is a very convenient way to try to give the impression that one is
dealing with the problem but it is not a solution to the problem.
Next, the assertion of environmental jurisdiction over an activity, as should
be apparent to any lawyer, is tantamount to the assertion of control over the
activity itself. Absent very refined work by very competent lawyers, one can-
not say there is freedom of navigation in the 200-mile zone and comprehensive
control over pollution in the 200-mile zone by the coastal State. The two
statements are just flatly incompatible with each other unless, as this text does,
one goes on at great length trying to harmonize those two propositions.
Finally, eighty percent of scientific research done in the oceans is done
within 200 miles of the coast of some country. Therefore, when we speak of
scientific research in the oceans we are speaking largely of scientific research at
present in the proposed Economic Zone.
So much for the background facts on this. If this treaty were to emerge as
one generally recognized, the new geographic structure of the oceans could be
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very simply laid out. There would be a maximum twelve-mile territorial sea. In
areas where the territorial sea overlaps straits, there would be a regime of free
passage for aircraft and vessels, including submerged submarines. There
would be a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone in which, as Ambassador
Castafieda has indicated, the coastal State would have sovereign rights over
resource matters, certain jurisdiction over other matters, and in which
freedom of navigation and overflight, submarine cables and pipelines, and
other freedoms would also obtain. Those freedoms, as the new text makes
clear, are the same as the classic high seas freedoms, subject to a duty to have
due regard for the rights of the coastal State in the Economic Zone and subject
to certain environmental restraints. There would be coastal State control of the
continental margin resources, the oil and gas basically beyond 200 miles, sub-
ject to some duty to share revenues beyond 200 miles. A classic sort of high
seas regime in its pure form would obtain beyond 200 miles. There would be an
international organization to regulate deep-seabed mining beyond 200 miles or
the continental margin, which means for this century, manganese nodules.
There would be a new concept of archipelagic states in which independent
island nations could enclose the waters of their archipelagoes under certain cir-
cumstances as archipelagic waters, subject again to a regime of free passage
through essentially fifty-mile-wide corridors traversing the archipelago for air-
craft and ships, including submerged submarines. That is what the oceans
would look like.
The problem evidenced best by the Economic Zone is that unlike the classic
division of the oceans into territorial sea and high seas, in which a geographic
description of what you were doing in essence gave you most of the legal
answers, the key word to this new approach to the law of the sea is "func-
tionalism." It would not do to ask the client where he was in the oceans in
order to determine his jurisdictional rights. You'd have to ask him where he
was and what he was doing in order to determine whose jurisdiction he was
under.
The classic example of this is the Economic Zone. If he were 100 miles from
the coast and was fishing, most of the legal questions associated with his
activity would be resolved by reference to coastal State law. If he were 100
miles from the coast and was navigating, most of the normal legal questions
relevant to his activity would be determined by reference to the laws of the flag
State. In both cases, of course, one would bear in mind criteria contained in
the Convention.
This is an exceedingly bold experiment as to whether you can take a single
geographic area of immense importance and superimpose upon it two types of
legal regimes for different activities: coastal State control, or mare clausum,
and freedom of the sea, or mare liberum. To do this as a sheer matter of draft-
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ing requires a great deal of care and a great deal of skill. It is open to serious
doubt (a factor which ought to be taken into account in weighing the future of
this Conference) whether that kind of nongeographic accommodation of rel-
evant interests can last in the absence of a positive law document. The only
kind of positive law document you can have in the international community is
basically a treaty. There is, in my opinion, a significant risk that, absent a
treaty, the kinds of accommodations involved become so delicate and so dif-
ficult, and the number of States involved is so great, that the result is uncer-
tain, to say the least.
Ambassador Castafieda has addressed the process of the Conference itself. I
would like to step back, particularly from the United States perspective, and
comment on some of the reasons for that kind of a process. The end result of
the Conference is supposed to be law. In treaty form it is supposed to be a
generally acceptable treaty. Now it simply does not do in that sort of situation
to say "We will set down a set of Articles and we are going to vote on them."
The voting situation does not-dramatically does not in this kind of a Con-
ference-reflect the relevant balance of interests. And it is not only a question
of North-South situations. The States with broad continental margins are a
decided minority. Yet, they have valid interests that should be taken into ac-
count. Land-Locked States are a relative minority. Yet they have valid in-
terests. If we were to vote on a majority basis, point by point, on a treaty of
this sort, I suspect in the end we would have a treaty that nobody would be
able to ratify because in this kind of a situation virtually every State finds itself
in a minority on some kind of subject. Therefore, the relationships become
exceedingly complex.
Thus, the Conference decided to function by consensus. You can imagine
trying to function on any subject in this room by consensus. You can imagine
how difficult it would be, as Ambassador Castafieda has indicated, trying to
negotiate anything in a room of this size. To take a simple example in which
there were only two positions, you walk in on a particular point. Your opening
position-let's say it was a money issue-was $10 and you had a fall-back
position of $15. Ten people in the room have been very active. The time comes
when it appears that compromise can be struck. You go to your fall back,
which is $15. It looks like it is agreed. And all of a sudden someone who hasn't
spoken before stands up and says "I object." This is what is called in the
parlance of the Conference "salami slicing." It is an exceedingly difficult pro-
cess. As I indicated earlier, the end result in the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text is a document which, with the very important exception of
deep-seabed mining, does seem to be within reach of a general and comprehen-
sive treaty on the law of the sea. In this sense this Conference has already come
close to achieving what the earlier 1958 Conference (and even the 1930 con-
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vocation conferences) were unable to achieve. All of the issues addressed by
those conferences seemed to be close to resolution, but were not. Here I can
say that they are, noting that the United States for its part is engaged in a
policy review and I cannot make definitive statements on this, except to say
that the text on deep-seabed mining is unacceptable. What is impeding this
part of the text is, of course, the altogether new problem of deep-seabed min-
ing. It is interesting to look at that problem as against the others to see how
this process can work and where it breaks down.
Ambassador Castafieda was correct in stating that the Composite
Negotiating Text and its predecessors had no formal status. In the case of the
Second Committee issues, however, which are of the greatest importance to
the Conference, these do in fact reflect results that were negotiated, though
without commitment, among interested States. What hapened was that the
Chairman tested the water and found significant-if not universal-support
for various provisions, and he used these results as the basis for the Articles he
put into the Composite Negotiating Text. It was not the Chairman sitting in an
ivory tower and dreaming up his own sense of optimum solutions. This was so
well done in the Second Committee that with the very first text, the Single
Negotiating Text-despite the fact that it did contain Articles unacceptable to
us and others-it was already clear to the majority of participants that the
Chairman was within shooting distance of a generally acceptable result, pro-
vided some problems could be corrected.
In the First Committee there has been a very, very different situation on
deep-seabed mining. The first text to be issued by the Chairman of the First
Committee was virtually a verbatim copy of the positions presented by the
Group of 77. I must say that, on some issues, it was even worse from an in-
dustrial perspective. There was an outcry. The second time around there was
some attempt at informal consultation, discussion and negotiation with all the
difficulties and pitfalls Ambassador Castafteda has identified. A second text
was issued in the Revised Single Negotiating Text, with which the United
States said that it had significant problems; but which developing countries
said swung too far in the direction of the industrialized States.
Prior to this session, informal negotiations were undertaken between ses-
sions and there was significant negotiation undertaken at the session itself. I
know Mr. Laylin is going to go into this. As a result of both negotiations,
problematical texts were produced by Minister Evensen of Norway who
presided over these open-ended negotiations. They were problematical. They
were hardly perfect or the last word from anybody's point of view. They did
go to full meetings of the Group of 77. They were not flatly rejected there.
They were not flatly rejected by others. And yet the Composite Negotiating
Text was significantly altered in ways I think Mr. Laylin will describe. Both
texts paid court to official Group of 77 ideology, even on points where the
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Group of 77 had indicated a measure of flexibility. And the end result was, at
least insofar as the United States and I suspect other developed States are con-
cerned, an unacceptable text.
I raise this simply to stress the fact that the Conference process adopted here
can work or cannot work. It is a process which really combines in the chair the
functions of both Chairman and Special Rapporteur, as it were-two func-
tions that in some cases have been classically separated in other conferences. It
is not entirely clear what alternatives are available on this matter. Where the
United States is concerned, there are some painful decisions that will have to
be made by the Administration. The question of whether this Conference can
be organized so as to deal with the remaining issues (in particular the deep
seabeds issues) in a way that adequately takes into account our own interests as
consumers of the metals involved; our own interests as potential deep-seabed
producers and, I might say, some of our interests in other aspects of the text;
is something that must be carefully weighed in view of what has already hap-
pened. The broader issue is that this method of trying to develop law does not
work. Then what is the method that you have for the development of law?
What are the costs of the process of consent and practice as against the costs of
this kind of a system? Those are the kinds of questions that will have to be
weighed by our government and by others in the intervening period.
I do think, however, that it is important, at least from a lawyer's perspec-
tive, to bear in mind the immense number of issues that the Conference has
dealt with. In some instances, it has dealt with these in a very revolutionary
way. And in some instances, apparently, which is the most one can say, the
issues have been worked out with a significant measure of success.
MR. HAIGHT: Thank you very much. You have touched on some of the
prickly problems before this Conference and our government.
Myron Nordquist, who as I have said was with this activity a year ago and
earlier and has since been appraising and analyzing what has been going on at
the University of Virginia, will pursue some of these difficult subjects from the
coast out to the extent of coastal State national jurisdiction and, so, I'll turn
this over to him now.
Myron H. Nordquist,
Senior Fellow,
Center for Oceans Law and Policy,
University of Virginia
I want to make it very clear that what I am saying here is, at the least, my
personal view. My remarks may even be something less than my own views
because I think there are some points that are being raised in the informed
oceans community that perhaps we should bring out on the table here. I don't
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. I
38 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
necessarily agree with all the points that are being raised, but I think some are
legitimate issues that should be talked about. Certainly, as the two prior
speakers have brought out so much better than I could, the Law of the Sea has
undergone almost an indescribable revolution in the last few years. Just twenty
years ago, 50 percent of the coastal nations had three-mile territorial seas.
Only 15 percent had a twelve-mile territorial sea or something greater in
breadth than twelve. Today, only 20 percent of the independent coastal States,
including the United States, have a three-mile territorial sea, while 70 percent
of the coastal States in the world have a 12-mile territorial sea or one of greater
breadth.
With respect to the 200-mile zone, the differences are even more marked. At
the 1958 Conference, the first Conference on the Law of the Sea, there were
fewer than a half-dozen states that claimed some form of 200-mile jurisdic-
tion. Now 50 of 128 independent coastal States claim some type of 200-mile
jurisdiction. The simple recitation of these figures about claims makes it very
clear that there has been a very profound change in the attitudes towards the
ocean in the recent times.
At this stage, the Law of the Sea Conference has settled on the figure of
twelve miles for the breadth of the territorial sea. Twelve is the only figure that
has any hope of obtaining a majority of votes at the Conference. A 12-mile ter-
ritorial sea is not without its problems, however. As was mentioned, the First
and Second Law of the Sea Conferences failed to reach agreement on any
figure for the breadth of the territorial sea. Indeed, the Second Conference
was convened specifically to deal with the question of reaching a uniform
breadth for the territorial sea and the extent of fisheries jurisdiction. Hence it
can be said that it is a substantial achievement to have a number of states
clustering around the 12-mile figure. However, as Mr. Oxman indicated, a
problem is caused by coastal State sovereignty overlapping the strategic water-
ways around the world. This has led the Third Conference draftsmen to come
up with a regime for straits providing for unimpeded transit passage. The
reason this doctrine is needed is that the doctrine of innocent passage evolved
before there were submarines or aircraft. For example, an aircraft in a foreign
state's territorial sea has to have permission to pass through. A submarine is
required to be on the surface, because the innocent passage doctrine was
evolved for vessels on the surface. Extending the territorial sea to twelve miles
overlaps all water areas less than twenty-four miles in breadth. Thus 116 straits
used for international navigation become overlapped.
One can imagine the problems for the United States if we were unable to
gain access without permission to the Mediterranean, where the Soviets are
able to enter through the Black Sea. The Third Conference has come up with
an acceptable solution on a 12-mile territorial sea coupled with straits transit.
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This achievement bodes well for the international community in promoting
stability.
Another area where the Conference deserves a few kudos is on the issue of
archipelagoes. The basic problem with an archipelago claim is that there are a
limited number of geographical entities, such as the Philippines and the
Bahamas, Fiji and Indonesia, that consist of scattered islands. These nations
have a big political problem in wanting to promote a sense of national unity.
The difficulty is that if one takes the straight archipelago theory, one might
draw what could be characterized as a steel ring around the islands. Within the
right an internal waters regime could exclude foreign traffic passing through
without the permission of the archipelago state. The accommodation worked
out at the Third Conference is a recognition of the archipelago with a
guaranteed right of archipelagic passage through designated sealanes. I think
the Conference deserves credit for having found a balanced solution to this
problem.
As a personal view, I am not as happy about the 200-mile zone as many
others are. For the United States it's a mixed blessing. The United States gains
more resource area than any other country in the world by the extension to 200
miles, an area that's about equal to our continental land masses. That's a lot
of area. However, only about 25 percent of that area, insofar as fisheries are
concerned, has enough fish for the Coast Guard to patrol. Why did we claim
the other 75 percent? The answer, of course, is international politics. The
200-mile limit gained respectability from the Law of the Sea Conference. At
the same time, the United States should be able to protect its coastal fishery in-
terests more effectively having made this assertion. But, again, I am not as
happy about the 200-mile zone as some because I think the claim was more
than was needed to cope with the problem.
The Continental Shelf Convention was one of the four Conventions that
was concluded in 1958. Under the Exclusive Economic Zone a coastal State
has the same kinds of jurisdiction over offshore petroleum resources as under
the Continental Shelf Convention. Again, I must ask what was the need for the
Exclusive Economic Zone insofar as continental shelf resources were con-
cerned? One of the principal outstanding issues, aside from the status of the
Economic Zone, that must be resolved at the Third Conference, is how far
coastal State rights over the natural resources of the continental shelf extend
beyond 200 miles. This could imply that the customary law regime of the con-
tinental shelf exists coextensively with the regime of the Exclusive Economic
Zone.
There are other problems. For example, in declaring its 200-mile zone the
United States extended a fishery circle around Johnston Island- a little patch
out in the Pacific half of which was dredged up from the sea bottom during
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World War II to make a landing strip. This assertion covers over 125,000
square nautical miles of resource jurisdiction of the United States. Where
should the line be drawn between what resource entitlement is given to what
entities and what isn't? Certainly the Trust Territories of the Pacific would be
in line to assert jurisdiction over some three million square nautical miles of
ocean space following the example of Johnston Island.
The pattern in modern times, and the genesis for a 12-mile territorial sea,
was a 12-mile fishery zone. There has been an avalanche of states adopting
200-mile fishery zones after the United States extension. If that historical ex-
perience teaches anything, we should be concerned, in my view (with or with-
out a treaty), that the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone will become a
200-mile territorial sea. The frightening part is that the United States will prob-
ably lead the pack in making incremental claims. Each step will be so small
that, for example, a veto will not be justified.
The impetus to extending coastal State jurisdiction beyond 200 miles with
respect to petroleum, of course, was strengthened by the action of OPEC. Vir-
tually any nation not self-sufficient in petroleum could hardly go to a
multilateral conference and agree to give up claims no matter how colorable,
to any potential offshore petroleum after the OPEC countries acted. But how
far should coastal State jurisdiction extend over the continental margin
beyond 200 miles? No one knows. One of the most popular formulas offered
at the Conference could extend out as far as 600 miles in some places. I am not
sure of this, but I submit no one else knows at this time how to apply the form-
ula relating to thickness of sediment around the world. We do not possess the
physical facts to implement the rule.
In connection with continental margin jurisdiction beyond 200 miles, many
States believe there should be international revenue sharing. The formula
that's embodied in the CINT was suggested by the United States. This idea
seems acceptable except that the CINT then goes on to say that developing
countries which are not importers of petroleum do not have to make contribu-
tions no matter how far they claim beyond 200 miles. There are obvious defini-
tional problems. What is a developing country? What is a geographically
disadvantaged country? The landlocked, an identifiable group of States, and
the "Geographically Disadvantaged States" maintain that they should have
preferential rights for fishing within their neighbors' economic zone. Included
in the ranks of the so-called GDSs are the Federal Republic of Germany and
Poland. An area where there has been an improvement at least over the 1958
Convention is in the land-locked access to and from the sea. If there is any
meaning to the term equity, this would seem to be an issue where sympathy is
warranted.
Another major outstanding problem area concerns delimitation. The two
basic approaches are: (I) split the difference, i.e., "the equidistance rule" or
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(2) look at special circumstances, i.e., equity. The Conference has made some
progress on this question but the problem certainly has not been solved.
I have tried to focus on some issues and problems that we ought to think
about. May I ask: What from a United States standpoint would the treaty give
us? From a deep-seabed regime standpoint, one would have to conclude that
the United States has the money and the lead in technical expertise for this
mining. On practical grounds, we probably do not need an agreement on the
deep seabed. The CINT text is overly complicated anyway, considering that
deep-seabed mining hasn't even been shown to be economically feasible. In
any case I am not sure that any agreement that could be negotiated on the deep
seabed would be beneficial to the United States, on balance.
With respect to marine science, the CINT does not permit the freedom to
study-the oceans that existing law does. The CINT has a consent regime which
is detrimental to the scientific community in the United States. For the marine
environment, the result is, on balance, a plus. The CINT doesn't go very far
but perhaps some provisions are better than no treaty at all. With regard to
dispute settlement, there is a plus or a minus depending on whom you ask.
From the Executive Branch, certainly from the State Department's viewpoint,
dispute settlement is a definite plus. But there are many influential Con-
gressmen who will not be happy about some of the dispute settlement provi-
sions. We must face up to that reality sooner or later. The United States has
already asserted 200-mile fishery jurisdiction. The treaty adds little on that
subject. With regard to the rights over the continental shelf-problems like
artificial islands and the like aside-the results in the treaty are very similar to
what one has under existing customary international law.
The two major advantages to a comprehensive treaty are the postponement,
and perhaps curtailment, of the Exclusive Economic Zone becoming a full-
fledged area of national sovereignty. We have no guarantee that incremental
jurisdiction will be stopped. But the creep should be at least postponed by a
satisfactory multilateral treaty that balances freedom of navigation and
coastal State sovereign rights over resources. As the major navigating nation at
this stage in our history, the treaty rates a net gain on this score and this must
be given heavy weight. The day may come when the United States will want a
200-mile territorial sea, but that day isn't here yet. The second major advan-
tage that I see in a treaty is difficult to evaluate. That is, we should have more
order and stability in the oceans than without a treaty. This point is very im-
portant.
The question must be asked: Do the overall benefits of a likely treaty
outweigh the overall detriments? The prospect is good that the United States
Congress will act in many areas, if the Conference doesn't. This may be done
in a way that will make it impossible for our negotiators to negotiate further.
Thus, the question is particularly relevant from a timing standpoint. What
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alternatives are available in the event that a comprehensive multilateral agree-
ment isn't achievable? The world does not appear to be ready for a deep-
seabed treaty. I doubt that the differences can be reconciled. There is a large,
fundamental gap between what the United States Senate would approve and
what the Group of 77 would accept. I don't think this political reality can be
papered over. The positions are too hardened by sincerely held philosophical
differences. I don't see a way out. If that's true, I still believe a treaty that con-
firmed the rights and duties in the 200-mile zone could be concluded at a con-
ference of invited States convened outside of the United Nations. We do not
need the agreement of all nations in order to influence substantially the
customary law of the sea. Once advantage of such a conference would be to
reach an understanding on the jurisdictional rule out to 200 miles, an area that
is about equal to all of the land territory on our planet. There is a case that can
be made for like-minded States to agree on what can and cannot be done in
this most important ocean area.
One can see there has been quite a fundamental change in the thinking about
the oceans. The President of the Conference who addressed the 1958 session
expressly referred to the sea as the "common heritage of mankind." A mere
twenty years later that concept has come to mean something entirely different.
This can either be attributed to the marvelous flexibility of the English
language or to a marked shift in the way nations view the oceans.
MR. HAIGHT: Thank you very much. We certainly probed and touched on
some very key issues and I particularly liked the last note on "flexibility of the
English language." We shall hear more now . . . on the difficulties of this ex-





The 1977 Committee I Fiasco
Progress has been made on those parts of the Law of the Sea Convention
that deal with the rights and duties of states in the zone seaward 200 miles from
the coastline. No little part of the credit for this progress is owing to the Chair-
man of the Committee to which this topic was referred. He welcomed the
efforts of groups to find formulae to accmmodate the different interests and
divergent views of the various states and incorporated the results in his
negotiating text. A notable illustration of this is in the adoption by the Chairman
of Committee 11, Andres Aguilar M., the Venezuelan Delegate, of a formula
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worked out through the patient, responsible and creative coordinated effort of
our distinguished Dr. Jorge Castafieda.'
The committee charged with the area beyond the 200-mile Economic Zone
(Committee I) might have enjoyed comparable success had its chairman also
welcomed the suggestions of those seeking an accommodation of the different
interests and divergent views. Unhappily, the text he submitted at the end of
the session which adjourned in July largely ignored all efforts at accommoda-
tion and embraced the position of a few of the extremists in the so-called
Group of 77 developing nations.
A suggested compromise formula submitted by Jens Evensen of Norway
was the product of weeks of negotiation in Geneva between the so-called
moderates in the different groupings and further negotiating and informal
meetings of all delegations during the Conference session. It did not meet all
the requirements of many delegations including our own but it was a step in
the right direction.
The principal issue was access to the minerals on the deep seabed in this area
beyond the 200-mile Economic Zone. The United States, in August 1970, put
on the table a working paper that provided for nondiscriminatory access to the
deep-seabed mineral resources by all land-locked as well as coastal States and
their nationals. The International Law Section in 1969 approved a report of its
Committee on Oceanography which advocated-this principle, and a resolution
to the same effect was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association in August, 1973.2
A group of developing states opposed this. Led by delegates from metal-
exporting states, they proposed closing the Area to exploitation except by an
international organization to be governed by them.
'Progress was also made in Committee III toward agreement on settlement of disputes (Part
XV, Annexes IV, V, VI and VII). No little credit for this is owing to the preparation, persistence
and ingenuity of Professor Louis B. Sohn.
it is resolved that the American Bar Association:
As to Seabed Resources Seaward of the Limits of National Jurisdiction
(3) RECOMMENDS that the United States insist that any international regime established
with respect to the areas seaward of the limits of national jurisdiction incorporate the following
principles:
(a) That the United States and other developed countries have representation in the governing
council which gives adequate weight to the economic importance of the resource to their
people;
(b) That any international authority created be administrative and regulatory only, with
power to allocate areas, and that it have no control over volume or rates of production,
distribution or pricing of seabed resources.
(4) RECOMMENDS that the United States implement its announced policy of encouraging
exploration and exploitation of seabed resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction dur-
ing the negotiation of a treaty and supports the companion policy of seeking the provisional en-
try into force of the seabed mining aspects of any treaty that is agreed upon.
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The Evensen formula attempted to accommodate both views by providing
for exploitation side by side, on the one hand by the international organiza-
tion, and on the other by States or their nationals. It gave the international
organization, called the Enterprise, certain decided advantages. Any state or
its nationals would be obliged to submit applications for two areas. The Enter-
prise could choose for itself the one it preferred. It thus benefitted without
effort or expense in the prospecting done by the applicant. The device of
exploitation side by side was called the "Parallel System" and the privilege of
reserving one block for exploitation by the Enterprise was referred to as
"Banking."
The text submitted by the Chairman of Committee I permits a Parallel
System only to the extent conceded by an Authority under effective control of
an assembly in which each state has an equal voice, not only in debate but in
making decisions. This was done in full awareness and likely anticipation that
no state or its nationals would invest in deep seabed mining the viability of
which would be at the mercy of an assembly of 150 some states with the
smallest having the same vote as the largest. The experience in the General
Assembly of the United Nations has given notice that such a body is irresponsi-
ble. An Assembly in a seabed authority should, like the General Assembly of
the United Nations, have debating functions, yes, but no power to act beyond
making recommendations.
But the text issued by the Chairman of Committee I after the close of the
Sixth Session of the LOS Conference added insult to injury. Besides subjecting
mining by states and their nationals to the whims of a one-state, one-vote
assembly, it provides for the continuance of mining only by the Enterprise
after a twenty-five-year period, unless a conference held then votes by a ma-
jority of two-thirds affirmatively to permit this.
The first Evensen formula, while pointing toward an accommodation, made
concessions so modest as to be unacceptable. Ambassador Richardson, in a
statement read to the informal group, listed certain changes which the United
States considered to be essential. Mr. Evensen, thereafter, improved his pro-
posed text. The Chairman's text turns backward from even the first Evensen
formula.
Domestic Legislation
Over five years ago bills were introduced in both Houses of the Congress'
providing for regulation of deep-seabed mining by persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States pending the coming into effect of an agreed
international regime. It was severely criticized by delegates from some of the
'5S. 2801/H.R. 13904, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
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copper exporting countries and by not a few others, including some
Americans. The criticism rested upon a misunderstanding of the purpose and
effect of the proposed legislation.
The critics assumed that the intent was to set aside areas of the deep seabed
for the exclusive use by persons licensed to mine by the United States. That it
did not attempt to do. What it did propose to do was to regulate activities by
persons subject to jurisdiction of the United States and only those persons.
None could mine except under a license issued to responsible applicants. Say a
license were issued to Deep Sea Ventures. Nothing in the proposed legislation
purported to give this licensee a right to exclude from the area covered miners
from any country other than the United States. All it purported to do was ex-
clude from the licensed area miners subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. Nationals of other countries would be free to mine in the same areas
unless restricted by the laws of their own governments.
There is now pending in the Congress proposed legislation along the lines of
the bills introduced over five years ago with amendments, however, designed
to promote a proper understanding of the scope and reach of the proposed
legislation.'
Some excerpts from the House Bill (H.R. 3350) as reported on August 9,
1977 follow:
To promote the orderly development of hard mineral resources in the deep seabed,
pending adoption of an international regime relating thereto.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
American in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that-
(1) the United States' requirements for hard minerals to satisfy national in-
dustrial needs, will continue to expand and that the demand for such minerals will
eventually exceed the available domestic sources of supply;
(2) in the case of certain hard minerals, the United States is dependent upon
foreign sources of supply and that the acquisition of such minerals from foreign
sources is a significant factor in the national balance-of-payments position;
(3) the present and future national interest of the United States requires the
availability of hard mineral resources which are independent of the export policies
of foreign nations;
(4) there is an alternate source of supply of certain hard minerals, including
nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese, which are significant in relation to national
needs contained in the nodules existing in great abundance on the deep seabed;
(5) major deposits of such nodules have been proven to exist in areas of the deep
seabed which are seaward of the limits of national resource jurisdiction recognized
by international law;
'S. 2053/H.R. 3350.
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(6) various mining companies are engaged in developing the technology
necessary for the commercial recovery and processing of such nodules;
(7) given the necessary investment climate, United States mining companies are
prepared to undertake programs for the commercial recovery and processing of
hard minerals from the deep seabed;
(8) it is in the national interest to establish a program to encourage the explora-
tion and commercial recovery activities of United States citizens and that such ac-
tivities be regulated in a manner to protect the quality of the environment;
(9) The United States supported (by affirmative vote in the General Assembly)
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2749 (xxv) declaring the principle
that the mineral resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of mankind
but recognized, however, that this principle would be legally defined under the
terms of a comprehensive international Law of the Sea Treaty to be agreed upon in
the future;
(10) since the parties currently attempting to negotiate a comprehensive interna-
tional Law of the Sea Treaty have been unable to come to a final agreement, and
since their failure to reach agreement may slow the development of the technology
necessary to develop the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed, interim
domestic legislation is required to encourage the development of such technology
to continue; and
(11) deep-seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas, subject to a duty of
reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of that and other
freedoms recognized by the general principles of international law.
(b) PURPOSES.-The Congress declares that the purposes of this Act are-
(1) to establish an interim program to encourage and regulate the development
of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed by United States citizens, pending the
entering into force with respect to the United States of a superseding international
agreement relating to such activities;
(2) to insure that the development of hard mineral resources on the deep seabed
is carried out in a manner which will protect the quality of the environment;
(3) to encourage the successful negotiation of a comprehensive international
Law of the Sea Treaty which will give legal definition to the principle that the
mineral resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of mankind; and,
pending the entering into force of such a Treaty, to provide for the establishment
of a special fund the proceeds of which shall be used for sharing with the interna-
tional community pursuant to such Treaty; and
(4) to allow the continuing development of technology necessary to develop the
hard mineral resources of the deep seabed as soon as possible.
TITLE I-REGULATION OF EXPLORATION
AND COMMERCIAL RECOVERY BY
UNITED STATES CITIZENS
SEC. 101. DISCLAIMER OF EXTRATERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
By the enactment of this Act, the United States-
(1) exercises its jurisdiction to regulate United States citizens in the carrying out
of development of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed; but
(2) does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign rights over, or the ownership
of, any area of the deep seabed.
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SEC. 108. RECIPROCATING STATES
(a) DESIGNATION.-The President may designate any foreign nation as a
reciprocating state if the President finds that such foreign nation-
(1) regulates the carrying out of development of hard mineral resources of the
deep seabed in a manner comparable to that provided for in this title and the
regulations issued thereunder:
(2) recognizes existing licenses and permits issued under this title to the extent
that such nation prohibits any person engaging, under its laws, in exploration or
commercial recovery which conflicts with that authorized under any such license
or permit; and
(3) recognizes, under its procedures, priorities of right for applications for
licenses or permits that are consistent with those provided for in this title and the
regulations issed thereunder.
(b) EFFECT OF DESIGNATION.-If any foreign nation is designated as a
reciprocating state under subsection (a), no license or permit shall be issued under
this title permitting any exploration or commercial recovery which will conflict with
any license, permit, or equivalent authorization issued by such reciprocating state.
TITLE I1-TRANSITION TO INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT
SEC. 201. EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
If an international agreement enters into force with respect to the United States,
any provision of this Act, and any regulation issued thereunder, which is not incon-
sistent with such international agreement shall continue in effect with respect to
United States citizens. To the extent that the provisions of such international agree-
ment permit, the United States shall sponsor applications from United States citizens
who are licensees and permittees at the time such agreement so enters into force and
shall insure, to the maximum extent possible, that such licensees and permittees
receive the same rights, and have the same duties, under such agreement, as are pro-
vided for under this Act.
SEC. 203. CONTRIBUTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
No later than the 180th day after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary shall submit to the Congress specific legislative recommendations for re-
quiring contributions to a special fund the proceeds of which shall be used for the
payment of United States contributions to an international regime (established under
an international agreement) for sharing with the international community pursuant
to such agreement. Such recommendations shall include such provisions as the
Secretary deems necessary and appropriate, including, but not limited to, provisions
relating to the source, amount, and computation of the contributions required, the
structure of the special fund, the tax treatment of the contributions (if contributions
are required of licensees or permittees), and the disposition of the fund in the event
that an international agreement does not enter into force with respect to the United
States or United States contributions of the kind referred to in the preceding sentence
are not required.
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Spokesmen for the countries that want no competition with their mineral ex-
ports from metals recovered from the deep seabed will find any number of
reasons for opposing enactment of legislation such as this by the United States
and other countries. Amongst the reasons already articulated are the
following:
1. It will wreck the Law of the Sea Conference. Some United States citizens
have naively taken this argument of the foreign critics at face value. This was
thought to be the case before the Chairman of the First Committee himself
wrecked the Conference. The judgment of experienced observers is that if the
wreckage can be salvaged, enactment of the proposed legislation will not be an
impediment.
When the Ninety-Fourth Congress was considering legislation to regulate
coastal fishing 200 miles seaward, the then head of the Law of the Sea Division
of the State Department predicted that enactment would wreck the Con-
ference. Not only did it not, it promoted adoption of similar measures by other
countries and agreement on a 200-mile Economic Zone.
To be sure, there was already a general consensus on this issue, whereas on
the exploitation of the deep seabed, the views of various groups of nations dif-
fer sharply. But, however sharply the division is as to what the international
regime to be set up by treaty should be, there can be little serious doubt that
each state has a right to regulate the activities of its own nationals whether in-
side its boundaries or on the high seas.
Nor can a convincing case be made against the continued vitality of the right
of each state and its nationals to enjoy the freedoms of the seas, one of which
is to recover and keep nodules found in the deep seabed. Since the proposed
legislation limits its scope and reach to activities of persons under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States while exercising this freedom of the seas, there is no
legitimate ground for attacking the international aspects of the legislation.
2. A second citicism has been that enactment by the United States and other
industrial countries of legislation of the sort under discussion will make un-
necessary a multilateral treaty on deep-seabed mining. To the extent that that
criticism has validity, it undermines the argument that enactment would wreck
the Conference. If agreement on deep-seabed mining issues becomes un-
necessary, the Conference can abandon the wreckage wrought in Committee I
and reduce to treaty form and sign-hp on the other issues.
To the extent that this second criticism lacks validity, then those states that
feel the need for agreement can set about negotiating between themselves. A
treaty achieved through diplomatic negotiations could be joined by others
when and as they choose to become parties.
3. At least one domestic critic opposes the legislation on the ground that its
only purpose is to help four corporations make money. That assumption ig-
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nores the real purpose of the proposed legislation-to reduce the dependence
of the United States on foreign sources of strategic metals. This purpose is ex-
pressed in the first three of the "findings" of Section 2 of H.R. 3350,
reproduced above in this paper.
There have been rumors that the Department of Defense opposes the pro-
posed legislation and favors giving in on Committee I issues. It considers that
this will assure agreement on navigational freedoms. This reasoning has had a
serious setback with the introduction into the Committee I text of articles sug-
gesting a right in the one-state, one-vote assembly to require its consent to
research on or in the high seas beyond the 200-mile Economic Zone.'
Future Course of Action
The foregoing must not be understood to advocate abandoning attempts to
salvage the wreckage in Committee 1. It is suggested that we continue to try to
bring about agreement on an international regime. Our efforts should include
participation in the succeeding sessions of the Law of the Sea Conference but
should not be confined to that forum.
Assuming that the Administration decides to go along with legislation along
the lines of H.R. 3350, a first step should be to explain the scope and reach of
the legislation through our diplomatic missions to all interested states. There
will be some countries that will criticize the United States however skillfully the
matter is handled, but the reaction will be less articulate than if the matter is
raised in a session of the LOS Conference. There, many delegates must speak
out to protect their personal positions from attack by rivals at home who covet
their jobs. Once the legislation is afait accompli, most states will adjust their
policies to live with it.
The states whose nationals are members of one or another of the consortia
are likely to take measures to qualify as Reciprocating States. At present these
are the United Kingdom, Japan, Belgium, the Netherlands and West
Germany. Other maritime powers may follow. The United States and the
Reciprocating States will undoubtedly consult to work out parallel regulations.
In the course of these talks the outline of a single treaty between them will
emerge.
'The President of the Conference, H. Shirley Amersinghe, in an explanatory memorandum
issued July 15, 1977 stated with respect to a new paragraph of Article 151:
The question whether the new provision on scientific research in article 151 is sufficient to in-
dicate the role that the Authority may be expected to play in this activity, which is very impor-
tant to the international community, may require further discussion.
This statement should be read bearing in mind the provisions of Articles 133 and 143 as well as
paragraph 7 of Article 151.
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As the outlines do emerge, diplomatic talks can take place with other in-
terested states such as the USSR and France, possibly Brazil, Mexico, Norway,
Denmark, Greece, Canada and Australia. Without calling a formal conference
or getting involved in United Nations procedures a "mini-convention" can be
agreed to and ratified.
This should, of course, be open to accession by other states but there must
be no machinery as elaborate as that contemplated in the United States work-
ing paper of August 1970 or the successive negotiating texts. The experiences
in the LOS Conferences sessions as well as in the United Nations General
Assembly have demonstrated that the world is not yet ready for anything ap-
proaching a global parliament with one-state, one-vote.
Moreover, deep-seabed mining is not such a tDig deal as to call for elaborate
machinery.6 The regulations of the Reciprocating States and any treaty
relating to the regulation of deep seabed mining must, nevertheless, provide a
clearinghouse for informing one another of the areas as to which licenses have
been issued or are pending issuance. The International Bank of Reconstruction
and Development might agree to establish an office to perform this function.
There would be little need for this office to exercise discretion, but such as
there might be, could be protected from the politicking of a one-state, one-
vote body through the weighted voting procedure of the Bank. The USSR, to
be sure, is not a member of the Bank but the precedent of its negotiating with
the European Economic Community on fishing rights encourages one to
believe some formula could be devised to overcome this obstacle.
It goes without saying that no step should be taken to secure the blessing of
the General Assembly of the United Nations or of the LOS Conference for
uniform regulations or for a mini-convention. Yet, we should stress in the
regulations and mini-convention, as the draftsmen of H.R. 3350 have in that
bill, that once the Conference comes up with an acceptable treaty, the treaty
should govern the rights and obligations of the parties.
Returning to the procedure through the LOS Conference, it is believed that
the United States and the Reciprocating States should take care to participate
seriously but without hurrying the other participants to come around to an ac-
ceptable treaty covering deep-seabed mining. We should continue to maintain
that the ultimate solution to be found is a convention to which all states
subscribe. The issues in Committee I are a part of the still wider issues between
the developed and developing states and therefore call for patience and
understanding. But the Committee I issues are more likely to be resolved if the
industrial states are not in a hurry for a convention worked out through the
'Public opinion has been dealt with unjustly by romantic overestimates of the magnitude of prob-
able mining. Costs of recovery will keep profits too low to encourage "bonanza operations."
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Conference. With satisfactory domestic legislation and regulations worked out
in consultations between the Reciprocating States, the pressure to reach an
agreement through the Conference is removed.
In discussing the unacceptable provisions of the text issued by the Chairman
of Committee I, mention is made of only two-each of which is so objec-
tionable as to make the text unacceptable even if every other provision were
satisfactory. But there are other provisions which by themselves alone also
prove to be fatal. A list of the more objectionable provisions is set out in a
press release issued by Ambassador Richardson on July 20. Excerpts are set
out in the footnote.7
MR. HAIGHT: Thank you very much, particularly for the constructive note
of hope for the future.
Now we have left Professor Sohn to the end. He has been very patient. He
has much to tell us and we look forward to hearing him.
Professor Louis B. Sohn,
Professor of International Law,
Harvard Law School
My task is to discuss an issue to which very little public attention has been
paid, not even by lawyers for whom the problem of settling disputes is of
special importance. You can realize by now, I think, from the previous
'it would not give the reasonable assurance of access that is necessary if we and others could be
expected to help finance the Enterprise and to accept a "parallel system" as a basis of com-
promise.
It could be read to make technology transfer by contractors a condition of access to the deep
seabed-subject, at least in part, to negotiation in the pursuit of a contract.
It could be read to give the Seabed Authority the power effectively to mandate joint ventures
with the Authority as a condition for access.
It fails to set clear and reasonable limits on the financial burdens to be borne by contractors;
indeed, it simply combines a wide range of alternative financial burdens, as if such a combina-
tion could be a compromise-when, in fact, it is likely to prove a compound burden sufficient
to stifle seabed development.
It would set an artificial limit on seabed production of minerals from nodules-which is not
only objectionable in principle; it is also far more stringent than would be necessary to protect
specific developing-country procedures from possible adverse effects, and is incompatible with
the basic economic interests of a developing world generally.
It would give the Seabed Authority extremely broad new, open-ended power to regulate all
other mineral production from the seabed "as appropriate."
It would appear, arguably, to give the Authority unacceptable new power to regulate scien-
tific research in the Area.
It would fail adquately to protect minority interests in its system of governance and would,
accordingly, threaten to allow the abuse of power by an anomalous "majority."
It would allow the distribution of benefits from seabed exploitation to peoples and countries
not party to the Convention.
It would seriously prejudice the likely long-term character of the international regime, by re-
quiring that-if agreement to the contrary is not reached within 25 years-the regime shall
automatically be converted into a "unitary" system, ruling out direct access by contractors, ex-
cept to the extent that the Authority might seek their participation in joint ventures with it.
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speakers that what we are embarked on is drafting a Convention of some 303
Articles plus 103 Articles in the Annexes, many of them very complicated,
many of them very unclear, many of them contradictory, and as a result we are
going to have a large number of disputes arising with respect to them.
Very early in this Conference it was decided that we did not want to repeat
the 1958 mistake where the provisions on dispute settlement were put in an op-
tional protocol which very few States ratified, not even the United States. And
when we had later disputes with other countries, of course nobody could in-
voke this protocol. Consequently, it was decided very early, during the Con-
ference in Caracas, to establish at least an informal working group on the sub-
ject. It prepared, first, alternative texts, later a more complicated single text
and that was simplified by the president in a text which he issued in his own
name as chairman of the Conference as a whole.
That text was discussed in three New York sessions in great detail,
paragraph by paragraph. We started with only thirty states being interested in
it; in Geneva, thirty more came in, and we had sixty of them actively par-
ticipating. At each session of the Conference twenty more said that they were
interested in compulsory settlement of disputes, so that by now we have about
120 states which have committed themselves publicly to this system of settling
international disputes. And this is a tremendous difference from previous
practice. In the past most international conventions either got only a concilia-
tion system without binding decisions or, if binding decisions, only in very
small areas, or alternatively simply an optional protocol which was accepted
by only a few states. In particular, many developing countries, as well as the
Soviet bloc, refrained in the past from participating in trying to develop
systems for settlement of disputes.
At this Conference for the first time both the Soviet bloc and the developing
countries not only joined in the preparatory work for a settlement system but
in fact pushed for it. The Soviet Union was very interested in settling disputes
relating to fisheries and then it broadened its interest to other areas. The
developing countries from the very beginning also wanted a special tribunal to
deal with the subject and as a result they got interested in the subject as a
whole.
What happened was that we started with a general agreement that we need a
system, a system leading to binding decisions. But we could not agree on what
the system should be. Some countries preferred the International Court of
Justice-Japan, for instance, and the Netherlands-saying, "We already have
that Court, it is being wasted, it has very few cases, why not use it for this pur-
pose?" Other countries said we have been successful in the past in arbitration:
why not have an arbitration system? France and the Soviet Union said this is
not really a single area. We have a number of quite different problems requir-
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ing quite a number of different types of people in those various tribunals.
Therefore, we have to have a functional system, lists of competent people in
particular areas, out of which special tribunals then would be chosen. As men-
tioned before, the developing countries, especially the African ones, from the
very beginning said that they prefer a special tribunal, they don't like arbitra-
tion, because many arbitration tribunals might go in different directions, and
you would have the problem of reconciling different decisions. They didn't
like the International Court, especially the Africans, because of certain deci-
sions they did not find palatable, and as a result they expressed preference for
a special tribunal.
So we had four contenders and as a result we had to find a way to reconcile
them. This was done by agreeing from the very beginning that any system must
be a flexible one. States should be able to choose the system they want. If they
choose arbitration, that they can have. If they choose the International Court,
they can have the Court. If they choose a special tribunal like even the Euro-
pean Community's tribunal, they can use that one. Therefore, the next step
was a suggestion by Professor Riphagen from the Netherlands that everybody
can choose the tribunal he wants and then you sue him before the tribunal he
has chosen. Therefore, if you choose arbitration, you can be called before an
arbitral tribunal. If you have chosen the International Court of Justice, then
the other party can bring you only before the Court.
That did not, however, 'make everybody happy; in particular the Africans
who said, "But that method will force us to go to the International Court of
Justice in some cases and we don't like that." The Soviet Union said that this
solution might force it to go to the special Law of the Sea Tribunal, and they
would not want to go to that one. As a result, we finally agreed that, in case of
disagreement among the parties about the chosen method, they will have to ac-
cept the lowest common denominator, which happens to be in this case ar-
bitration. Everybody says, "If I cannot have anything better, at least I accept
arbitration." Therefore, this became the chosen instrument in case there is no
agreement among the parties on something else.
That was our problem number one. Our problem number two was the fact
that, as you were told this afternoon, even before we got to discussing the
various law of the sea matters, we have discussed for several years the problem
of seabed mining and in connection with that a draft was developed of a
special tribunal to deal with seabed mining questions. This tribunal was in a
way an administrative type of a tribunal like the French "Conseil d'Etat" or
like, to some extent, the Court of the European Communities. Most of the
disputes to be decided by it would be disputes between an international
authority and the contractor or a State which wants a contract or some other
rulings or decisions from the Authority. This type of tribunal is well known in
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other countries and it was said that it would be very good to have such a
tribunal for seabed matters. Unlike the International Court of Justice, it
would be accessible to contractors, individuals, and other public corporations.
Its jurisdiction could thus be more widely open, resembling again the Court of
the European Communities.
Suddenly we were faced with two tribunals, one for the seabed, one for the
law of the sea in general, and the question of how to reconcile them arose.
Many countries said immediately "We don't want two tribunals." On the one
hand, they did not want the Law of the Sea Tribunal to deal with seabed mat-
ters; on the other hand, they did not want the Seabed Tribunal to extend its
jurisdiction to other matters. Finally, our group came out with the following
solution: there will be a general tribunal of twenty-one members out of which a
tribunal of eleven members will be selected to deal with seabed matters. So,
you have a Chamber of this bigger tribunal to deal with seabed matters, a
Chamber selected by a double system because first the Conference of all the
parties to the Convention will elect the twenty-one, and then the Assembly of
the Seabed Authority will select the eleven being especially competent to deal
with seabed matters, that election to be done in both cases by a two-thirds
vote. That was again a matter causing trouble for several years and we were
very successful in negotiating this at the last session and finally solving it, to
the satisfaction, it seems, of everybody.
The last trouble on this issue was with the Soviet Union and the East Euro-
pean countries. They said, "We cannot accept the Seabed Chamber as
obligatory for seabed disputes because this way incidentally we would be ac-
cepting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as a whole." So we had to devise a for-
mula so they can accept one without having to accept the other.
The third problem we had related to an issue that Ambassador Castafieda
mentioned-about the scope of jurisdiction of the tribunal with respect to
matters arising in the Economic Zone, especially matters relating to living
resources. On that one over the years we went through a number of formulas
because we have had to solve a double problem. Many countries, including in
particular the Soviet Union and Japan, have been arguing for a long time that
the whole system of dispute settlement for them has no meaning unless at least
some disputes relating to fisheries would be subject to some jurisdiction. On
the other hand, the coastal States were saying that now that an agreement has
been reached on the content of the Economic Zone, including their sovereign
rights over fishery resources, they did not want the management of those
resources to be subject to constant harassment before an international
tribunal.
The compromise we have in the current text tries to solve the problem by
two types of provisions. On one hand it tries to protect the coastal State
against harassment. It provides that where any case is presented to any
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tribunal it must be clear that it is a prima facie case. If there is no prima facie
proof that there seems to be a strong possibility of jurisdiction, the tribunal is
not going to take it at all. Second, the tribunal can reject it immediately if the
tribunal considers that there is an abuse of legal process or the complaint is
frivolous or vexatious. And in this preliminary proceeding the coastal State is
not even bound to participate unless it wants to, because the tribunal ex officio
has to take care of these preliminary questions, and has to see to it that those
provisions are complied with. Only if they have been complied with, can the
matter then proceed.
But even then there are various restrictions. The tribunal cannot deal with
any matter that is completely within the discretion of the coastal State. It is ex-
pressly provided that what must be avoided is to substitute the discretion of the
tribunal for the discretion of the coastal State. And in addition there is a provi-
sion that the sovereign rights of the coastal State cannot be called in question.
You might say, what then remains? Certainly if the coastal State goes far
beyond its discretion, if the coastal State is not simply exercising its sovereign
rights but goes beyond its sovereign rights, interferes with navigation and
other things, then in such cases there would be a possibility of submitting the
case to the international tribunal. But the limits, of course, would have to be
determined by the various tribunals once the matter arises.
The fourth problem that caused us trouble was the demand for other possi-
ble exceptions. The one that was very crucial to some countries was the excep-
tion relating to boundaries. The Soviet Union said, "We cannot accept the
idea that any dispute relating to our boundaries would be subject to interna-
tional jurisdiction." Turkey said the same; also Venezuela and a few others.
On the other hand, of course, in each case there was another State which said,
"We are not going to agree to the treaty unless we have a clause relating to
boundary dispute settlement." Therefore, again one of those apparent com-
promises has been adopted in which it is said: "All right. You don't have to ac-
cept dispute settlement under this treaty. But in that case you have to accept
some dispute settlement by some other method, somehow." And that method
has to be accessible to the other side. You cannot choose, say, the Supreme
Court of your own republic and say, "This is an impartial body. You have to
submit to it." You have to provide a tribunal that is accessible and impartial
for the other side.
And then we all accepted a solution for a closely related problem which also
worried the Soviet Union; namely, disputes that related supposedly to
maritime territory but related incidentally also to a contest about a land ter-
ritory: for example, the islands off the coast of Japan that were occupied by
the Soviet Union. Such claims to land territory may not be decided by the
tribunal.
Another problem related to military activities. The major powers have in-
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sisted from the very beginning that this is not a treaty that should apply to
military activities, not even the provisions relating to dispute settlement. Then
the coastal States came and said: "All right. In that case, also, the enforce-
ment activities by the coastal State should not be subject to jurisdiction." To
that again people said: "All right. Equity probably requires something like
that"; but they put a condition on it saying that those activities of the coastal
State which otherwise would be exempt from jurisdiction-for instance those
relating to certain aspects of fisheries-would also be exempt from jurisdiction
here. On the other hand, as activities relating, for instance, to pollution would
not be exempt from international jurisdiction, legal enforcement with respect
to pollution would not be exempt under this special clause.
Finally, there is a provision exempting disputes relating to cases which are
before the Security Council of the United Nations, unless the Council removes
the matter from its agenda or asks that one of the LOS tribunals be in charge
of the matter.
To finish, I think that what we have tried to devise is a very flexible system
providing a variety of alternatives but always ending by saying that whatever
we provide has to be obligatory, has to lead to a binding decision, at least in all
those areas which have not been expressly exempted by the treaty. We hope
that in this way at least we have made a good beginning at trying to establish a
system of dispute settlement for the first time for one of the most important
areas of international law. As Ambassador Castafieda said, a large part of this
is agreed. There are still some problems of further improvement of language in
one place or two, but it seems to me that we are pretty close to agreement. Of
course, this depends to some extent on agreement on other things. A number
of provisions here are drafted on the basis of language in other parts of the
treaty. If that language changes then, of course, the language here would have
to change also, either for better or for worse.
MR. HAIGHT: Thank you very much. You can see how fortunate not only
the United States but the world in general has been in having Professor Sohn
as the counsellor, leader and general guide in this difficult area.
Now you have listened to a great deal. Are there any questions?
Houston Lloyd,
California Western School of Law
Mr. Oxman and Mr. Nordquist have both expressed a great deal of op-
timism about the possibilities of the outcome. If that is correct, why has
Ambassador Richardson suggested that the United States consider seriously
withdrawing from the negotiations? I'd ask Mr. Oxman to speak on that.
MR. OXMAN: It's very hard to listen to yourself, but I must say as a listener I
did not hear Nordquist sounding all that optimistic and I did not intend to be
that either.
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To clarify on that point-if the insistence is on a comprehensive treaty deal-
ing with all of the subjects identified in the agenda, which includes the deep
seabed, and if the differences of opinion over the deep seabeds continue to be
as intractable as they have appeared, there is an obvious conclusions to be
drawn. The result on the deep seabeds was identified clearly by Ambassador
Richardson as unacceptable both in substance and in terms of a process which
wholly, in every possible respect, disregarded a procedure designed to take into
account the interests and views expressed by the United States.
Now, the Administration will review the situation in the light of these
developments. It will have to weigh both the substance and the implications of
continued participation by the United States in a process leading to the kinds
of results produced in the final week of this Conference on deep-seabed min-
ing. In weighing those considerations it will have to consider the factors which
I think Mr. Nordquist outlined well: the factor of bringing a regime of law and
order to bear; the factor of the preservation of navigational rights and
freedoms, I would add not only in the economic zone but in straits; and it will
have to reach some appropriate conclusions. The fact that the United States is
the State with the primary technology and interest in deep-seabed mining
should be accorded at least the same degree of respect as the fact that with
respect to the continental shelf beyond 200 miles there is one State par-
ticipating in this Conference that has over fifty percent of the area at issue. It
has nevertheless been accorded a high degree of respect on that issue. I think
the United States is correct in demanding no less on this question.
I cannot predict the outcome of the policy review. The decision on what is
regarded by most of the world as the major multilateral undertaking since the
founding of the U.N. itself is very weighty and will have to be made at the
highest levels by the Administration. It will be a difficult one.
Carlyle E. Maw,
Cravath, Swaine & Moore,
New York, N.Y.
My name is Carl Maw of New York.
I would like to ask Ambassador Castafieda: What in your view would be the
effect on the Conference if the United States enacted legislation as urged by
Mr. Laylin?
MR. CASTAtREDA: It is not easy to answer, particularly without knowing the
details of the legislation. My first impression, though is that that type of
legislation would have a very disruptive effect on the Conference. It might
mean perhaps the failure of the Conference. I think that we are all committed
to a treaty and that the lack of one would create a state of anarchy, of chaos,
of uncertainty in a vital sphere of international relations, which would be bad
for everyone, perhaps more for some countries than for others.
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The subject matter of the Conference cannot be split into the parts that you
like, where a treaty would be signed, and into other parts where countries
would feel free to act unilaterally against the clear interests and will of a strong
majority of States. You would certainly generate a very strong reaction and
would probably encourage unilateral attitudes on the part of other States,
perhaps even regarding those aspects that now seem more settled. You can be
sure that some of those unilateral actions would be contra legem.
I think that your legal position is weak. In spite of the precautions explained
by Mr. Laylin, I cannot see any legal basis, as I tried to prove in a lengthy
statement before the Conference some time ago, that would justify the
unilateral exploitation of wealth which is the "common heritage of mankind."
But leaving aside the legal aspect, I think you have to ask yourselves what the
political consequences of this would be. I am pretty sure what the effect would
be of a solution whereby a few industrial countries would get together and act
against the interest and the clear aspirations and wishes of a very large number
of countries. I think that you would be accentuating, increasing, a confronta-
tion between a large number of developing countries and some industrialized
countries, and this would certainly have great political consequences. This
would occur precisely at a time when efforts are being made in several fora to
bridge the gap and to see whether it is possible, little by little, and with patience
and with time, to establish a base for a new international economic order. To
take this type of action, I think, would disrupt those efforts. If I am not
mistaken, these were some of the reasons why Dr. Kissinger and you, Mr.
Maw, objected to the enactment of legislation authorizing unilateral exploita-
tion of the seabed. I think you were right.
MR. LAYLIN: I have the greatest respect for Dr. Castafieda's views and I
regret that the ten minutes to which I tried to be limited, did not allow time to
explain that the legislation that is under consideration is definitely interim
legislation and looks toward an agreement and everything in it is designed to
promote agreement.
Your question, Carl, was whether adoption of the proposed legislation
would wreck the Conference. I submit that as the Conference is already
wrecked, a better way of putting the question would be, "Will adoption of the
legislation interfere with salvage of the ruins?" My answer is that the only way
to salvage the wreckage is to adopt the legislation and demonstrate to those
who scuttled the Conference that we can continue on course without a treaty.
MR. FINCH: This question is for Mr. Laylin on the "common heritage of
mankind." If I might add confusion to confusion, I do not hear any remark
made that we are very much concerned in the United Nations with the use of
this phrase in regard to the natural resources of the moon. For more than the
last two years we have been negotiating a new moon treaty in the United
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Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. What is done in the
Law of the Sea treaty will have a definite effect from the point of view of
customary international law and otherwise with regard to the outcome of the
negotiations on the new moon treaty. And I point out that the interpretation
of those words by the Soviet Union, by the United States, and by a number of
other countries of this earth is different. It is very important to lay before this
panel the importance of considering the effect of the words and the semantics
of the interpretation of the common heritage of mankind and I would ask Mr.
Laylin to comment as to whether the effect of these words is being considered
in the larger context.
MR. LAYLIN: I claim no expertise with respect to negotiations as to the
resources of the moon. As a practicing attorney, I would certainly hope that
they would stay away from so ambiguous a phrase.
MR. LANE (Wisconsin): Mr. Oxman, this question is triple, but it's closely
related.
. Under existing principles of international law can Spain act unilaterally to
close the Straits of Gibraltar? Do we now have freedom to negotiate those
straits? And if it was then confirmed by a new treaty, why would it be called a
new freedom?
MR. OXMAN: I am going to give you a long answer to a short question.
As some of you will recall, the Canadian government after considerable
debate in public proceeded with the assertion of a 100 mile pollution zone in
the Arctic. At the time, a number of writers in Canada were arguing that there
should be a complete assertion of sovereignty and it was a matter of public
record that a close adviser of the Prime Minister of Canada had done a thesis
at Harvard University on Canadian sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic.
The Prime Minister was asked why the assertion was limited to pollution
jurisdiction. Prime Minister Trudeau in his response referred to a number of
factors, but he stated that if your objective is ultimate control, you start out by
doing something reasonable.
Now, can Spain close the Straits of Gibraltar? I don't think that there is a
single state in the world including Spain that would argue that the issue is the
closure of these Straits. They are 7.4 miles wide at their narrowest point. Spain
today claims two enclaves on the North African coast which, if attributed the
normal territorial sea, would mean that, if the maximum permissible breadth
of the territorial sea under international law is in excess of three nautical miles,
it is impossible to negotiate the Straits of Gibraltar without traversing the ter-
ritorial sea of Spain. In any event, you would have to traverse the territorial
sea of Spain or Morocco even if those enclaves did not exist. The current
United States position is that the maximum permissible breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea is three nautical miles. The government of Spain asserted a six-mile
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territorial sea prior to the independence of the United States and maintains
that it never received a protest note regarding that assertion either from Great
Britain or from the United States subsequent thereto.
The position previously stated by the Spanish government is that the rule of
non-suspendable innocent passage obtains in the Straits. Under those cir-
cumstances vessels on the surface would have a right of innocent passage
which could not be suspended. A coastal State would have the right to take
measures necessary to prevent passage which is not innocent. Aircraft would
not enjoy a right of innocent passage. As you know, under the Chicago Con-
vention, they would require the consent of the subjacent State to overfly the
territorial sea. Submarines are required to navigate on the surface. Spain has
made public statements that the passage of supertankers is inherently non-
innocent. The United States, of course, maintains that at present there is a
path of high seas running through the Straits of Gibraltar beyond three miles
from either coast and, therefore, we exercise the full freedoms of the sea. That
is the existing juridical situation.
The practical situation is, of course, obviated by the fact that Spain is a
military ally of the United States and, therefore, under its interpretation, addi-
tional rights being exercised by the United States are being exercised by virtue
of the bases treaty between the two countries. When I say that there would be a
new straits regime in the treaty, what I mean is that the territorial sea would be
extended from three to twelve miles and that in straits as a part of the conse-
quence of that extension of the territorial sea, a more liberal passage regime
than non-suspendable innocent passage would be applied to all straits around
the world. But I do not mean to leave any doubt that in the view of the United
States there is complete existing freedom to negotiate these straits on the sur-
face, in the air, and beneath the seas.
MR. HAIGHT: Professor Okolie...
MR. OKOLIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
After listening to the distinguished panelists here, I note five areas of impor-
tance: (1) the 200-mile economic zone; (2) deep-sea mining, as explained by
Mr. Laylin; (3) the common heritage of mankind; (4) the transfer of
technology to developing countries; and (5) the settlement of disputes, as ex-
plained by Mr. Sohn. My questions relate to No. 2-deep-sea mining-and are
addressed to Mr. Laylin.
You mentioned that pending United States legislation provides for cross-
licensing for deep ocean mining, and that the government of England has been
asked to examine this legislation for possible comment. Can you explain this?
Further, does this pending legislation provide for the transfer of technology
to developing countries so as to enable them in time to acquire technical skills
in deep sea mining technology? Also, would you comment on the right to share
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in the exploitation of the deep sea resources by all mankind based on the con-
cept of common heritage of mankind?
MR. LAYLIN: I would preface my reply by saying that the Committee has in-
vited the United Kingdom to comment on the proposed legislation. I propose
that this should be done by every interested nation. If your country is in-
terested in a provision about transfer of technology, I would suggest that you
take the initiative in passing that information on.
Now, you will understand that the United States cannot require companies
to transfer the technology used in the United States. These are proprietary
secrets that they have developed at a tremendous expenditure of time and
money. You also understand that the United States itself cannot go out into
the deep sea and extract nodules. You see how we are getting along with our
postal system and you can imagine how successful we would be in recovering
anything from the deep sea. At present it is open to every country to retain the
services of Deep Sea Ventures or somebody else. If it is open to that country,
then it is also likely to have reciprocal advantages if it wants to set up a similar
system.
I am sorry I cannot answer your question more fully beyond urging you, if
you have views that you would like to have taken into account in that legisla-
tion, to please put them in writing and please tell your friends to do that.
That's what we want.
MR. HAIGHT: I think we are very grateful to you for having raised this
because it opens up the point that John has just mentioned-that this
technology is not available to the United States Government or to anybody
else. It's private property. This is an area that we haven't gotten into and it is
one of the big problems in this Conference that the rights of private com-
panies, private citizens, are involved in this whole process. This is very difficult
for the Group of 77 to understand because most of them do not have private
companies such as we have in this country.
Is there another . ...
MR. MEYER: My name is Gerald Meyer of New York. I have a question for
Mr. Nordquist with reference to the point of the small islands and the
economic zone. Suppose there are two countries 400 miles apart from each
other-Country A and Country B-and suppose Country B owns a small
island 200 miles away, or about at the equidistance point. Would that reduce
the area that Country A is entitled to 100 miles and leave Country B with 300
miles under the economic zone theory?
MR. NORDQUIST: If Country B in the hypothetical that you gave had an
island situated approximately equidistant between the mainland territory of B
and A, B in fact would not be in an "equidistant area." In other words, on the
assumption that B's island was capable of sustaining human habitation under
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the present CINT text, that island would be treated the same as Australia. One
would split the difference between B's island and A under the equidistance
theory. There might be additional facts that we don't know with respect to the
continental shelf. If B's island were a geological feature that constituted part
of the prolongation of the land mass of B or A, one might have different con-
clusions. Likewise, the result could change if B's island were an isolated
volcano projecting above the sea. We actually have this kind of problem (not
the same distances, of course) between the United Kingdom and Ireland in
respect to the isolated island called Rockall, which is nothing more than a pin-
nacle. Rockall is interestingly complicated by the scientific fact that apparently
it floated away from Greenland many centuries ago. Thus, the short answer to
your question is that B's island probably would be treated as a base point for
splitting the difference between A and B under either the continental shelf or
economic zone rules of delimitation. But particularly with respect to the con-
tinental shelf concept, the facts or "special circumstances" of the individual
case regarding the geomorphology or geology of the island's sea floor might
alter the mathematical rule.
MR. HAIGHT: On this point, there is the recent decision of the arbitral
tribunal which decided the boundary between the United Kingdom and France
in the western reaches to the English Channel. In this decision, the tribunal
had to decide what to do about the Channel islands which, as you know, lie off
the coast of France. The United Kingdom argued that the Channel Islands
were sitting on its continental shelf and that it was entitled to the entire area
between them and its own coast. The tribunal said no, they were entitled to no
more than the territorial sea. So they got 12 miles on the north and the west,
and the tribunal refused to decide on the boundaries between the Islands and
France. It left that to negotiation.
Then, they had to deal with the matter of the Scilly Isles off Land's End and
they refused to take those fully into account, as I understand it (I haven't seen
the decision yet) in deciding the boundary between the United Kingdom and
the coast of Brittany. There is some island off the coast of Brittany that they
did use as a base point in reaching that decision.
Any other questions?
I'd like then to ask each one of the panelists whether they would like to say
anything further before we call this to an end.
Nobody has anything further to say. Therefore, I thank you all for coming
and listening to this and I thank the panelists very much indeed for their
wonderful contributions.
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